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

Animal Rights and Conceptual-Terminological Domination

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Animal Rights and Conceptual-Terminological Domination

“Animal” is not merely a biological category. It is a political infrastructure of domination: a conceptual-terminological construct that organizes the non-human as a manageable difference, thereby establishing a hierarchy of thought and action – a hierarchy in which the “human mind/human spirit” [*das Geistig-Menschliche*, everything pertaining to the human mind] as an idea pits the supposedly non-thinking animal against itself in an antagonism [“supposed to be grounded in nature”].

Where Criticism of Authority Ends in Itself > On Blind Spots in Animal Advocacy

I. Five Preliminary Statements

1. Anyone who defines “animal” in the manner presently customary exercises a form of power.
2. Anyone who criticizes power without examining their own power to define, remains within the structure.
3. Aid, without the aid of critical analysis, potentially stabilizes hierarchies.
4. Violence ends in physical assault, but (nevertheless) begins with compartmentalization.
5. Freedom that seeks to label and manage everything, generally remains domination.

II. The shortened critique

In German-speaking countries, animal rights activism is generally understood as a moral extension. Animals should be taken into account because they suffer. Because they feel. Because they are similar to us. The problem, however, does not lie in compassion. The problem lies in the narrow perspectives on animals and animal concerns.

While there is a general expectation – and broad recognition – that social power relations among humans are analyzed in a nuanced way – economically, culturally, historically, psychologically – when it comes to animal issues, the conclusion is simply deducted, and a moral appeal with a very narrow framing around animal independence is supposed to be sufficient – a framing that is itself rarely questioned, because, according to the normalized view, the entire realm of animal existence does not constitute topics that humans would regard as game changing agents in the world [as 'in der Welt die Dinge bewegend', as making a difference in the world], as pertaining to thought and mind, as "narrating," or as contextual.

Human culture and its self-preservation shape the past, present, and future, while animals are assigned a role in the course of events – one that is assigned in one way or another but is always secondary and subject to human claims of dominance. However, the fact that relationality – from a different position and especially against an animal backdrop – also represents its own history, present, and future, that must be regarded as central in a non-human-centric way, is a consideration which is generally not taken into account; instead, various side stages are created for the dislocated, human-dominated "original nature."

A campaign, an image, a call for reform are therefore limited in their impact to the messages that can be conveyed within a specific framework and approach. While the campaign addresses a social conflict, it does not necessarily address the reality of injustice and the structures that perpetuate injustice from a broader perspective.

If one's own understanding of injustice and speciesist systems of injustice is limited this implicitly signals that less analysis was needed for animals, because the issue is addressed only within such fixed boundaries. It is precisely in this refusal to engage in a comprehensive critique of domination – one that would do justice to the subject – that a hierarchy becomes apparent.

III. The Power of Definition

"Animal" is not simply a neutral category when it comes to people's attitudes toward the subject of their conversation. "Animal" is encoded as a social free pass

to set aside general ethical relevance, to organize relationality and evaluation of perspectivity, to establish one's own system-conforming boundaries of comprehension of subjectivity, and so on.
Whoever defines what an animal is simultaneously determines, among other things:

- what status he wishes to assign to animals,
- what rights he considers relevant and "worthy of being granted",
- what role animals play for him in relation to himself,
- how far his understanding of relationality reaches and how nuanced his conception of it is.

Defense, too, operates within a framework embodied by the concept of "animal." The formation of this category can therefore always be questioned – even if the claim of defense is ostensibly established at first glance.

If animals are granted limited ethical status but continue to exist *as a group defined not in terms of their autonomy* but within human terms and concepts, the structure remains intact. The position may have shifted – but not the system.

IV. The Parallel in regards to Nature

The same pattern is evident in environmental protection.
Nature, the natural world, is generally protected:

- because it is useful, can be instrumentalised, is a resource,
- because it is the basis of human existence,
- because it is perceived as stabilising and regenerative,
- because it must be preserved to the extent and in the manner necessary for "our" lives to continue on the basis of existing ecosystems and ecologies. In other words, "nature" is protected conditionally, subject to human claims of utility and dominion of whatever kind.

Nature appears as an instrument – even when it is being protected. In everyday discourse, it is not granted an independent measuring standard. For society, it exists within the framework of human purposes. The same happens with animals,

albeit on a more ‘animalesquely’-personified, emotional level, in which they become morally relevant: but not conceptually independent in > direct triangulation with the world and, in this respect, as ethical, formative agents and fellow living beings, co-beings [Mitlebewesen].

V. The Boundaries of Freedom

The Western concept of freedom is powerful – but it is centered. It grants the subject potential freedom, with boundaries set by epistemological and historically established value-based consensuses. It conceives of morality from the perspective of the human being, in that the building blocks of social relationality are tied to human self-experience, and a long chain of ascription prevents animals and relationality – as a conceived and felt social value – from being linked together, from a human perspective. What is interesting about the Western idea of freedom is that it distributes recognition.

What this freedom hardly allows for (and its universality enables it to apply its frameworks from virtually any perspective that enters into a relationship of compatibility), is a realm that is *permitted to elude* its classification:

As soon as animals or nature cease to be seen as manageable categories and instead become independent points of reference, the system as an idea begins to falter. And for this reason freedom often ends where the concepts it employs and recognizes as valid no longer apply.

VI. Violence Begins Earlier

Violence is not alone the absolute hell of the slaughter processes, the torture in any form of harshest confinement, or just any form of physical, psychological and tierlich-seelischer destruction. Violence begins where something is completely forced into a category, especially a problematic, negating category where the designated Other as counterpart is typically reduced to:

- Resource,
- Object,
- Manageable object of protection,

- A case requiring moral consideration

and the interplay of such administrative categories. As long as this form of categorisation is not critically examined, the analysis of the psychology of human violence remains incomplete in terms of speciesism and the objectification of animals. One criticizes the action to a certain degree, but one allows for omissions and thus consciously refrains from addressing all the depths of thought architectures and orders that make such attitudinal approaches possible.

VII. Why accommodation is not the solution at this time

From a new perspective that is capable of conceiving of animal rights as a distinct and unique field without evading fundamental questions of rights, it is possible to move beyond a mere claim for the granting of rights – the very foundations of which have, after all, been shaped by a culture of exclusion and transgression. For if, in the course of an attempt to create supposed compatibility, the basic categories which make up the unique characteristics of animal objectification remain untouched anyway, then the hierarchy will still persist.

A radical stance makes it difficult to align with movements that rely in part on limiting, pragmatic solutions. Not because reforms are wrong, but because they are often considered to be sufficient. Yet as long as the question of who holds the power to define remains unresolved, the structure itself remains intact.

As long as animals must be categorized in terms, in order to be recognized, their defense remains part of the very same order that renders them available. A critique of domination that fails to reflect on this limit is self-defeating. Anyone who wishes to fully expose force, must begin where it is most inconspicuous: in the act of authoritative categorization, which underestimates relationality.

VIII. Language, Speech, and Relationality

Criticism of the category “animal” does not imply that understanding animal existence and animality is impossible. On the contrary. A genuine approach can only be made where language reflects on its own function of ordering and no longer tacitly presents itself as a neutral description of the world. The problem

lies less in language itself than in the way its terms are organized – often closely tied to specific forms of human self-definition.

A different practice of language and terminology would therefore not attempt to classify animals entirely within human systems of classification, but would take relationality seriously. Language could function less as an instrument of classification and more as a medium of relationship. From such a perspective, the first question would not be what animals are within classificatory terms, but how encounter, coexistence, and shared relationships to the world [as Weltbezüge] can be described.

This, however, presupposes that the notion of humaneness also becomes more open. As long as "being human" is conceived primarily in terms of homogeneity and the devaluation of the non-human – through concepts of reason, language, culture, or morality that are far too narrowly conceived – then talking about animals will remain a language of definitional distance and, ultimately, of managing the Other, who is conceived as existing outside of this order.

A relational language, conversely, could acknowledge that animal existence must not be fully encompassed by human categories. It would not attempt to fully grasp the non-human in a pervasive manner in order to classify it [the non-human] within existing human systems, but would leave room for that which may, in many respects, elude the canonizing logic of human conceptual frameworks. In this liminal space, a different form of engagement and recognition could emerge: namely, a recognition of openness within shared world-relationships [geteilte Weltbezüge] while simultaneously respecting autonomy.

On the Intertwinement of Speciesism and Biologism

Gruppe Messel, Pamphlet

A Perspective on Relational Animal Ethics: On the Intertwining of Speciesism and Biologism (Revised Edition)

1. The Problem
– Speciesism is widely criticized in animal ethics.
– Nevertheless, discourse continues to rely on biological classifications of animals.
– Animals are primarily understood as organisms, species, or sentient systems.
The paradox: Critiques of domination are often articulated within the very conceptual framework that already objectifies animals.

2. The Concept: Critique of Biologism
– Biology is not merely a neutral science.
– Historically, it has primarily described animals as objects, not as existing Others.
– This perspective renders animals as objects of knowledge and administration.
The problem, therefore, lies not solely in the hierarchy of species, but in the reduction of animal existence to biological determinability.
Even critical approaches often remain within a framework that defines what animals can be in the first place—for example, when sentience or cognition serve as narrowly defined prerequisites for ethical consideration.

3. Consequences for Animal Ethics
Typical arguments in animal ethics rely on concepts such as:
– Sentience
– Cognition
– Nervous system
This means that animals are defined primarily by their biological characteristics. Their existence is situated within a classificatory framework that not only describes but also predetermines what is recognizable as an “animal” in the first place. A historically formative influence here is René Descartes’ reduction of

animals to “bodies” in the sense of the mind-body dichotomy. Consequently, their classification as objects of research, management, and evaluation became entrenched.

4. An Alternative Approach

Instead of defining animals primarily biologically, other approaches can be considered:

– Animals as coexisting subjects (relationality, ethics of a withworld, Mitweltethik)
– Animals as irreducible presences
– Animals beyond species categories and functionalist determinations

This does not reject biological knowledge entirely, but it refuses to let biology define the ontological status of animals, since breaking it down into properties, functions, or components already implies control over animal existence.

Even where ethics appeals to sentience or cognition, it often remains bound to a classificatory logic that forms animals as objects before ethical thought even begins.

Relational experiences show, however, that this framework can be transcended—such as when humans encounter animals directly and perceive them not as specimens, but as counterparts: as bearers of their own perspectives, not as bundles of properties.

5. A Brief Conclusion

– Critique of speciesism must extend to a critique of biologism.
– Animals cannot be reduced to biological objects or populations.
– Ethical coexistence requires acknowledging their autonomy beyond objectifying frameworks.

To truly challenge speciesism, we must be able to critique biologism as a central factor in definitional reduction and ethical constriction.

Ethical coexistence, in its full complexity, requires understanding animals not as “biological objects,” but as relational beings with their own existence and an agency that must be evaluated independently—a perspective that enables a real and justifiable shift in human-animal relations.

The circular reasoning that occurs in biology

The structure looks something like this:
Animals are studied in isolate as biological organisms.
Subjectivity is methodically excluded because it is difficult to measure.
The resulting picture shows functional, instinctive, adaptive systems.
From this, it is concluded that animals are essentially such systems.
Therefore, it is appropriate to treat them exactly as such.

The process thus produces precisely the picture that it later uses as justification.

The methodological reduction is reinterpreted ontologically.

--

El círculo cerrado que se produce en la biología

La estructura es más o menos la siguiente:
Los animales se estudian de forma aislamiento como organismos biológicos.
La subjetividad se excluye metodológicamente porque es difícil de medir.
La imagen resultante muestra sistemas funcionales, instintivos y adaptativos.
De ello se concluye que los animales son esencialmente tales sistemas.
Por lo tanto, es apropiado tratarlos exactamente así.

Así pues, el procedimiento genera precisamente la imagen que luego utiliza como justificación.
La reducción metodológica se reinterpreta ontológicamente.

Animal as Constructed Other – In Which Space, Really?

Animal History “From Below”

Animal Rights Messel

Preliminary note: Our critique(s) are not directed at individual persons, but at a structural tendency within animal-ethical discourse, which is of course represented through concrete positions. In a society shaped in nearly all areas by speciesist and animal-objectifying self-evidences, it is not sufficient to fit animals into existing philosophical frameworks. As long as the societal legacy of animal objectification is not fundamentally addressed, there is a risk that new theories will merely produce compatible variations of the same framework. Our concern, therefore, is not the production of further “discursively acceptable models,” but the naming of simple yet fundamental asymmetries that are frequently overlooked in theoretical operations.

Theory as the Final Instance of Animal Objectification? Philosophical Localization of Animals as “Strangers”?

An animal rights philosopher formulates it implicitly as follows:

The human being is the normative holder of space.
The animal is the one who arrives – tolerated, perhaps even welcomed – within this space.

We consider such a structure problematic. For it presupposes that animals could appear as strangers in a world they inhabited evolutionarily long before human territorial politics. Whoever appears here as a “guest” is already inserted into an order of possession. Hospitality implies household sovereignty. Toleration implies priority. The metaphor betrays the hierarchy it claims to overcome.

The philosopher’s chosen approach draws on Kantian concepts of perpetual peace, hospitality, and the right of visitation, which Kant related to relations among human groups. It is understandable that animal rights theorists repeatedly seek philosophical legitimation in this way, but:

Kant as an Unquestioned Matrix?

Whoever today invokes Immanuel Kant to clarify urgent ethical questions can no longer do so in a mode of unquestioned authority. In debates on universalism, reason, hospitality, or cosmopolitan right, it is no longer acceptable to adopt philosophical authorities as normative matrices without disclosing their historical and structural preconditions.

Engagement with Kant’s racial theories has demonstrated that his universalism was not free from implicit hierarchizations. If this universalism must be critically decoupled in order to remain compatible with anti-racist critique, then the same applies to its transfer onto nonhuman animals.

Within the construct under discussion, attention must be given to the terms:

Universalism
Reason
Otherness
Hospitality
Cosmopolitan right

These concepts emerged from a specifically human perspective [and under particular historical presuppositions]. They carry the exclusions of their time – including racist and speciesist structural assumptions. Why should a canonized mode of thought that historically treated animals as merely instrumental beings serve as the benchmark for animal-ethical justification?

The Methodological Difference

Here a structural asymmetry becomes visible. Human rights are not legitimized by first fitting humans into a philosophical matrix. No one seriously examines whether humans fulfill certain conditions in order to qualify as rights-bearers. In the case of animals, however, this is frequently exactly what occurs. First definition. Then categorization. Then evaluation.

What takes place is a triangulation that replaces immediacy between right and subject. In other words, conditionality displaces direct [relational] reference. This conditionality is constituted by:

Human theory
Human conceptual architecture
The animal as an object of examination
This method reproduces objectification by denying direct relationality as the binding starting point for grounding rights.

The animal does not appear as an immediately affected counterpart, but as a case within a system. His/her recognition depends on whether he/she fits predefined categories.

If human rights were treated in the same way, one would first have to evaluate whether humans meet certain theoretical criteria. The absurdity of this idea

reveals the methodological difference [degradation, devaluation, and fragmentation of relationality] and exposes how a biologistic pre-structuring functions as a narrowing prejudice shaping thought about animal concerns.

Epistemic Property

In approaches already to be considered "classical," animals are not taken as the starting point, but are integrated. They are included, expanded, taken into account. Yet they are understood within a framework that does not originate from them, because the foundational objectification is not doubted as a "truth" nor as the real starting point for designating the subject one seeks to approach. Thus animals become a form of philosophical property – not materially, but conceptually and philospohically. Their existence is administered through "human theory."

Point of Departure: Real Objectification

The decisive question is not: Which theory can adequately classify animals?
But rather: How do we end real objectification?

Real objectification manifests in:

Industrial, ritual, and eclectically practiced killing and injury
Legal status as objectifiable entities
Modes of instrumentalization
Habitat destruction, and the denial of habitat rights, for which humans interpret their own communal criteria as prerequisites for legitimate claim
Animal rights cannot primarily be constructed from canonical vehicles. They must proceed from immediate animal realities and the concrete conflict situations between human-hegemonic power and animal existence.

Not toleration. Not hospitality within a framework defined by those who exercise power and violence. Not integration into the existing system. Rather, the revision of the systems themselves would constitute an interruption of this vicious circle. We consider the claim that disruption within discourse is impossible to be a constructed intellectual prejudice. As long as prevailing theories refuse to cross certain thresholds, no transformation of conceptual norms within society can

begin – in a society where animal-objectifying language operates on multiple levels.

Art and Speciesism: Aesthetics and objectifying frameworks

“Progressive” art that reproduces speciesist hierarchies.

Animal objectification persists in contemporary art and academic discourse, often under the guise of critique, progressivism, or interspecies awareness. While overt exploitation is widely condemned, refined forms—taxidermy, hybridized displays, and aestheticized representations—remain accepted, even within frameworks claiming interspecies consciousness.

The problem is not crude use. It is the epistemic, symbolic, and corporeal transformation of animal existential being into instruments of human reflection. These beings are legible only under human terms, producing a definitorial hierarchy of epistemic blanks: structured zones in which animal agency, relational presence, and bodily integrity are erased or suspended, leaving animals visible solely through human categories.

In the following, “animal being” is used as shorthand for animal existential being.

Conditional Objectification and Epistemic Hierarchy

The structural problem is that animal being is treated as negotiable, not inviolable. Ethical evaluation focuses not on the animal itself but on the human argument: is the work reflective, critical, sensitive? The epistemic center remains human. Animals occupy epistemic blanks: present only to be interpreted, measured, or transformed according to human categories.

Internal speciesism emerges as hierarchically conditioned acceptance. Animals may be acknowledged as victims, yet their relational presence and bodily integrity are never treated as categorical boundaries.

Language, Representation, and Epistemic Mis-Mapping

Language and representation function as instruments of placement and mapping. Animals are located, named, and framed according to human priorities, producing epistemic mis-maps: they are legible only insofar as they fit human categories of meaning, suffering, or aesthetic value.

Representation is not recognition. Trauma, death, or sociality may be acknowledged, but the animal is transformed into a medium: its suffering material for reflection, its body a canvas, its existence a symbol. The authority to define animal experience remains entirely human.

The “We” of Knowledge

Two forms of “we” coexist in human discourse on animals:

Hierarchical “we” – the compulsory, authoritative collective that speaks for, judges, and maps animality according to human norms. It produces definitorial hierarchies, reproducing speciesist assumptions. Animals are positioned as epistemic blanks: gaps in understanding are treated as inherent rather than as opportunities to rethink frameworks.

Dialogical “we” – a provisional, reflective space capable of noticing absences, silences, and gaps—where animal being and bodily integrity remain unaccounted for. This “we” participates in recalibrating categories, context, and relational understanding without prescriptive authority.

Even progressive discourse can reproduce hierarchy when the hierarchical “we” appears gentle—acknowledging suffering, framing it critically, or celebrating aestheticized critique—yet retains authority to define what counts as animal experience.

Beyond Aesthetic Management

Animal inviolability and the persistence of species hierarchy are not resolved by empathy or reflection alone. The central problem is availability: as long as animal being remains accessible for transformation, even the most reflective art reproduces hierarchy. Liberation or abolition as vocabulary is insufficient. What is required is inviolability: animal being cannot be subject to human authorization, regardless of framing or context.

Illustrative Example: Taxidermy in Contemporary Art

Artists and curators may aestheticize trauma, bodily deformation, or death, transforming animal being into epistemic and symbolic material [1]. Even networks like Minding Animals, which prohibit trivialization, permit conditional use when the human framing is reflective or critical [2]. Objectification persists through conditional acceptance, showing how internal speciesism operates structurally rather than overtly.

Definitorial Hierarchy of Epistemic Blanks

At the core of internal speciesism is the definitorial hierarchy of epistemic blanks:

Humans define what counts as animal experience; what does not fit existing categories is treated as empty or negligible.

These blanks are simultaneously epistemic gaps for humans: without recalibrating our conceptual frameworks, we fail to grasp the presence, agency, and relational significance of animal being.

Recognition requires daring to think beyond hegemonially human-centered epistemologies, developing new terms, categories, and methods to account for animal existence on its own terms.

Toward Conceptual Recalibration

The philosophical and activist task is to address these structural gaps. What is needed is not better representation or refined empathy, but recalibration of fundamental categories: being, agency, context, and relational significance.

Withdrawal of availability: animal being must no longer be accessible for desubjectifying human symbolic or aesthetic transformation.
De-authorization: humans must relinquish authority to define, instrument, or map animal presence according to hierarchical standards.
Recognition of inviolability: animal being must be respected as structurally unassailable.
Until these shifts occur, even the most progressive art or discourse risks reproducing the very hierarchies it claims to oppose.

Conclusion

Internal speciesism often hides behind subtle, reflective, or “gentle” language. Even interspecies-aware discourse can perpetuate hierarchy when animals are treated as epistemic blanks. Structural progress requires:

Withdrawal of availability of animal being
Recognition of bodily and existential integrity as inviolable
Conceptual recalibration beyond hegemonial human-centered frameworks
Only then can animals be recognized as full beings, as themselves, rather than instruments, metaphors, or placeholders within human knowledge systems.

References

[1] See, for example, Jessica Ullrich, The Taxidermy Hybrid, ANTENNAE: The Journal of Nature in Visual Culture 7 (2008): 18–21. Available at: http://johnisaacs.net/press_files/ANTENNAE_7_2008.pdf (accessed 20 February 2026). Ullrich describes taxidermic hybridizations as imaginative and reflective artistic strategies, framing the transformation of animal bodies into hybrid objects as a productive aesthetic and conceptual practice. The animal appears primarily as material for symbolic recombination and epistemic experimentation. This discursive framing exemplifies how objectification can be rationalized through aesthetic and critical language, without addressing the structural question of the animal's inviolability.

[2] Minding Animals Curatorial Guidelines for Exhibitions (27 Sept 2017). Available at: https://www.mindinganimals.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Minding-Animals-Curatorial-Guidelines-for-Exhibitions-27-Sept-2017.docx.pdf (accessed 20 February 2026). The guidelines emphasize that artworks involving animals should avoid trivialization and should demonstrate ethical reflection and critical intent. However, they do not categorically exclude the use of animal bodies or materials. Instead, permissibility is conditioned upon the nature of the human framing and curatorial justification. This framework exemplifies conditional objectification: the ethical focus remains on the quality of human intention and discourse rather than on establishing the structural inviolability of animal being.

Fundamentals > Speciesism and Art

Theses on the Critique of Speciesist Art Continuums …
A Mapping of Aesthetic Mechanisms in the Normalization of Speciesism …
Violence in Art and Animal Objectification > Speciesism as a Means of Aestheticization and Arts Creation …

—

Animalistic Issue

Fundamentals > Speciesism and Art. [Version dated February 4, 2026]

Theses on the Critique of Speciesist Art Continuums

1. Speciesism is a fundamental social relationship, not a marginal problem.

Speciesism is not a misunderstanding, carelessness, or mere prejudice, but a structural relationship of violence that determines whose lives are considered morally relevant and whose bodies appear to be expendable.

2. Artistic continuities, particularly in the DACH region from Nitsch to his offshoots, are based on this accessibility

A continuum that is prominently established in the DACH region by H. Nitsch, his students, and today's followers presupposes socially accepted violence against non-human animals (which it requires) not as a theme, but as an ontological basis.

3. Animal bodies do not appear here as victims of injustice, but as a 'natural given' or matter of course.

Violence against animals is not addressed as a moral injustice, but treated as a culturally exploitable fact. The fact that it is made "meaningful" in aesthetic, symbolic, or ritual terms does not change its character as violence.

4. The question is not whether violence is '(also) meant critically'

The crucial question is not whether violence is intentional, reflective or contextualised, but rather: Why is violence against animals considered open to interpretation in the first place? This question would not arise in the case of violence against humans. The fact that it can be asked here is itself an expression of speciesist thinking.

5. Art functions here as a mechanism for refining societal violence

In these contexts, art does not become a place of questioning, but rather an aesthetic refinement of an already normalised relationship of violence. It makes acceptable what happens elsewhere on a daily basis: the reduction of living beings to expendable bodies.

6. Such places cannot be helped because their foundation is not critical but affirmative.

These places cannot be ‘reinterpreted,’ ‘critically used,’ or ‘transformed from within’ because they only function as long as the accessibility of animal bodies is socially accepted. Their existence depends on precisely what they purport to transcend. (…)

7. Societal normalisation is their actual basis for existence

These art venues do not thrive on provocation, but on habituation. Habituation to a world in which animal bodies are rendered commonplace as food, commodities, research objects or symbols – without this being considered an injustice.

8. The sacrosanct artistic field protects speciesism

The notion that art is beyond ethical evaluation serves as a strategy of immunity here. It allows violence to be aestheticised without having to take moral responsibility for it.

9. Individual vegan or animal-friendly attitudes do not change this

The fact that individual visitors or participants consider themselves vegan or animal-friendly does not disrupt the structure. As long as the basic assumption of the legitimate accessibility of animals is not challenged, participation stabilises the system.

10. Anti-speciesist criticism rejects aesthetic exceptions

As stated in our comments in the Animalistic Issue [https://www.farangis.de/blog/category/animalistic-issue, 04.02.26], this is not a matter of taste or symbolic debate, but rather a radical shift in the moral horizon: non-human animals are not carriers of meanings, but carriers of life, interests and vulnerability.

—

In a speciesist world, it is terribly easy to normalise speciesism – especially where it appears as art. What is considered an aesthetic liminal experience is in reality the cultural continuation of a violent relationship that is constantly being re-fundamentalised, here as rite and everyday life.

The aesthetic normalisation of animal bodies in art, language, science and culture does not serve critical reflection – that would be a contradiction in its own terms, unless one were to attempt to 'ethicise' violence as such and thus ideologically legitimise it – but rather reproduces and reinforces, as a logical and deliberate consequence, the speciesist relationship of violence, because the systems-given accessibility of animal subjects is taken as a matter of course.

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A mapping of aesthetic mechanisms in the normalisation of speciesism

Critique of the visual refinement of animal-objectifying practices in art, the art market and society

I. Basic assumption

Speciesist settings no longer require justification.
They require aesthetic infrastructure.
This infrastructure ensures that:

• Violence does not appear as violence
• Objectification is not named as objectification
• Criticism is either integrated or made invisible
The result is not conflict, but normality.

—

II. The most common aesthetic mechanisms

1. Aesthetic refinement
Mechanism:
Animal bodies, animal remains or animal-related violence are transferred through art forms (installation, photography, performance, design) into a space of meanings in which aesthetic value overshadows ethical questions.

Effect:
• Violence is perceived as refined
• Availability is perceived as legitimate
• Criticism is considered a matter of taste, not ethics
Normalisation effect:
What is beautifully framed is not considered problematic.

—

2. Symbolic abstraction
Mechanism:
Animality becomes a metaphor, a symbol, ‘material for something else’ (death, nature, transience, ritual, primal origins).

Effect:
• The concrete animal disappears
• Suffering is semantically outsourced
• The individual is erased
Normalisation effect:
Violence is no longer directed at the animal, but at an ‘idea’.

—

3. Ontological emptying
Mechanism:
Non-human animals do not appear as subjects with interests, but as:
• Bodies
• Forms
• Materials
• Relics
• Data

Effect:
• No moral addressee remains
• There is no one to whom injustice is done
Normalisation effect:
What is not a subject cannot be harmed.

—

4. Irony and distance aesthetics
Mechanism:
Animal objectification is presented in an ironic, playful, absurd or ‘broken’ way.

Effect:
• Criticism is defused
• Responsibility is denied
• Seriousness is considered naive
Normalisation effect:
Anyone who seriously disagrees is considered humourless or dogmatic.

—

5. Ritualisation and naturalisation
Mechanism:
Violence is portrayed as archaic, ritualistic, natural or culturally necessary.
Effect:

• History replaces ethics
• ‘It’s always been this way’ replaces responsibility
Normalisation effect:
What appears natural or ancient seems inescapable.

—

6. Scientific-aesthetic hybridisation
Mechanism:
Art draws on science, research, biology, archiving (e.g. artscience, taxidermy, bio-art).

Effect:
• Objectification appears factual
• Violence appears neutral
• Criticism is considered anti-rational
Normalisation effect:
What appears scientific is not considered ideological.

—

7. Market-driven depoliticisation
Mechanism:
Art that objectifies animals is:
• collected
• curated
• traded
• branded

Effect:
• Criticism disrupts the market
• Ethics are considered an externality
Normalisation effect:
What sells is considered legitimate.

—

III. Mechanisms on the part of the ‘opposing side’

8. Co-normalisation through relativisation
Mechanism:
Critical voices argue:
• ‘One must differentiate’
• ‘Art is ambivalent’
• ‘It’s a matter of interpretation’
Effect:
• Violence becomes opinion
• Injustice becomes perspective
Normalisation effect:
There is no longer a standpoint, only discourse.

—

9. Integration instead of confrontation
Mechanism:
Anti-speciesist criticism is invited, but:
• not prioritised
• not seriously considered
• not acted upon
Effect:
• Criticism serves to self-legitimise the system
Normalisation effect:
The system appears open, but remains unchanged.

—

10. Making radical criticism invisible
Mechanism:
Positions that fundamentally reject the objectification of animals are:
• not invited
• not quoted
• not discussed

Effect:
• The conflict appears smaller than it is
Normalisation effect:
What is not visible is considered non-existent.

—

IV. The core structural problem
There are no recognised spaces for this criticism
• No established art context allows:
o the rejection of animal-objectifying art as a legitimate point of view
• Criticism may analyse, but not refuse
• Rejection is considered anti-artistic, not ethically ‘justifiable’
Public discourse does not accurately reflect the problem.

—

V. Summary
Speciesist scenes do not normalise themselves despite criticism, but rather through aesthetic mechanisms that render violence invisible, diffuse responsibility and structurally exclude radical counterpositions.

—

VI. Concluding statement
The visual refinement of practices that objectify animals is not a side effect of speciesism, but its cultural cradle.
As long as there are no spaces that acknowledge the fundamental rejection of such art as a legitimate point of view, speciesism remains aesthetically secure – and socially untouched.

—

Violence in art and animal objectification

Speciesism as a means of aestheticisation and art creation

Speciesism is not a marginal phenomenon of cultural aberrations, but a fundamental social power relationship. It structures whose lives are considered morally relevant and whose bodies may be regarded as available, usable or meaningful. This distinction has a profound effect on social practices – in economics, science, everyday culture and, in particular, in art. There, speciesism is not only reflected, but often aesthetically stabilised.

The approach developed here does not understand speciesist art as deviation or provocation, but as part of a cultural continuum. This continuum, which is paradigmatically visible in the DACH region in the Nitsch scene, its current offshoots and related forms, refuses to critically examine and address violence, and persists in its unquestioned assumption of animal availability.

Non-human animals do not appear as moral subjects or victims of injustice, but rather as a natural resource for artistic meaning production.

The decisive factor here is not the intention of individual artists. Whether violence is ‘critically intended’, symbolically charged or ironically broken remains secondary. The real question is: Why is violence against animals considered open to interpretation in the first place?

Why is it considered aesthetically workable, while violence against humans does not have this openness? The fact that this question can be asked in an artistic context is itself an expression of a fundamental speciesist relationship.

In such scenes, art does not function as a place for questioning social violence, but rather as a mechanism for refining it. It shifts the problem from the level of ethical responsibility to that of aesthetic evaluation.

Animal bodies, remains, or discriminatory to completely destructive practices that typically target the mental and spiritual realm are transferred into symbolic,

ritualistic, or cultural spheres of meaning in which the violence itself becomes ‘invisible’ by being banished or exiled into the non-human realm.

What is framed aesthetically is no longer considered problematic, but rather complex, ambivalent or open to discourse. Recurring aesthetic mechanisms are central to this normalisation. Symbolic abstraction transforms concrete animals into metaphors for death/birth, nature/anti-nature or transience/eternity, thereby erasing individual feelings and experiences.

Ontological emptying reduces animals to bodies, substances or relics, leaving no moral addressee. Ironisation and distancing aesthetics deprive criticism of its urgency by labelling seriousness as naive or dogmatic. Ritualisation and naturalisation shift responsibility to supposed, securely hierarchical history, culture or presumed primevalism.

Scientific-aesthetic hybrid forms lend objectification the appearance of neutrality and rationality. Finally, market-based embedding completely depoliticises the practice by using marketability and market value as legitimation.

—

These mechanisms do not operate in isolation, but form an aesthetic infrastructure that stabilises speciesist practices. It ensures that violence does not appear as violence/a problem, objectification is not named, and criticism is either integrated or rendered invisible.

It is striking that normalisation does not work despite criticism, but often because of it. Relativising arguments – such as references to ambivalence, differentiation or openness to interpretation – transform injustice into mere questions of perspective. Invited criticism typically serves to legitimise the system without fear of structural consequences.

Radical anti-speciesist positions, on the other hand, remain ignorable because they question the fundamental availability of animal bodies, which reflects the norm in our societies. Speciesist art never allows itself to be abstracted into questioning the social norm of animal objectification.

The core structural problem for animal rights activists and anti-speciesists is that there are hardly any recognised spaces outside their own movement in which the fundamental rejection of art that objectifies animals is considered a legitimate position. Criticism may analyse, historicise or interpret – but it must not refuse. Rejection is discredited as anti-artistic, not recognised as ethically justified. Public discourse therefore does not accurately reflect the problem, but distorts it in favour of aesthetic self-immunisation.

Anti-speciesist criticism rejects this aesthetic exception. It insists that non-human animals are not carriers of meanings, but carriers of life, interests and vulnerability.

In a speciesist world, it is alarmingly easy to normalise speciesism – especially when it appears in the form of art. What is considered an aesthetic liminal experience proves, on closer inspection, to be the cultural continuation of a violent relationship that is constantly being re-established: as a ritual, as a symbol, as daily life.

The visual and cultural refinement of practices that objectify animals is therefore not a side effect of speciesism, but its cultural cradle. As long as there are no spaces that recognise the fundamental rejection of such practices as a legitimate standpoint, speciesism remains aesthetically secure – and socially untouchable.

Animal Rights and Punk > Non-Domination: World-Administration as Illusion

On Human Overreach, Negated Freedom, and the Anarchist or Anti-Domination Necessity of a Break Beyond Political Camps

The disenfranchisement of animals does not begin where they suffer under the consequences of human faunacidal actions. It does not begin with the physically normalized torture we call "exploitation," nor with violence, nor with destruction.

It begins much earlier, pre-symptomatically, with human overreach into the world.

This overreach is not a single historical error but a civilizational operation: the assumption that the world is available, that its meaning can be defined by humans, and that freedom is primarily—or exclusively—a human attribute.

In this grasp, animals do not appear as independent existences, but as components of an order claimed by humans. This is the original disenfranchisement.

Overreach as an Ontological Prerequisite
Humans have not merely situated themselves in the world. They have placed themselves above it. Ontologically, the world becomes an object. Politically, humans become sovereigns. Philosophically, meaning becomes something derived from humans. Normatively, freedom becomes a human monopoly.

In this act, animals are not explicitly negated—they are de-worlded.
Their independence is not denied; it is simply not acknowledged. They appear as resources, as disturbances, as functions, or later as moral problem cases. Every further act of violence presupposes this initial appropriation.

Step by step, across cultural histories, a process of negation unfolds: animals are first removed from social, cultural, and worldly contexts (desocialization), then

reduced to biological, symbolic, or functional categories (biologization/objectification). These processes consolidate the notion that animals exist outside the human-defined world, making their disenfranchisement normalized and invisible.

Why the liberal animal rights discourse sets in too late

The liberal animal rights discourse is considered progress because it protects animals, recognises suffering and formulates rights. But it sets in after the transgression.

It asks:

How should humans treat animals?
How can violence be limited?
How can use be morally regulated?
It does not ask:

Why do humans believe they have access to animals as distinct beings capable of freedom?
Why is human meaning-making considered authoritative?
This leaves the problem-causing worldview untouched. Access is not questioned – only pseudo-civilised.

Rights without recognition of freedom are administration

In liberal approaches, animals are granted rights because humans grant them these rights without being aware of their own causal transgression of boundaries. These rights are conditional protective rights, welfare rights, defensive rights against some forms of instrumentalisation. However, a philosophically serious concept of rights cannot arise from care. It arises from a basis of recognition of the capacity for freedom independent of one's own paradigm.

Capacity for freedom here does not mean autonomy in the humanistic or Kantian sense, nor self-rule, nor rational self-legislation. It means self-causality, self-reference and the existence of a relationship to the world that is beyond human control.
Animals are capable of freedom because they:

have their own logic of action,
develop their own social orders,
act in relationships, conflicts and dependencies,
cannot be limited by human concepts of domination.
This capacity for freedom is primary. It exists prior to any human attribution. Rights that do not recognise this freedom, but only regulate suffering, are not recognition – they are existential legal management.

The Necessary Shift in the Concept of the World
Recognition of animal freedom requires a shift in the entire concept of the world, and thereby in the self-definition of humans, animals, and meaning.

The world is not a neutral space whose significance emerges through human interpretation. Its meaning is not available to us. We cannot possess it. Humans do not stand before the meaning of the world—they stand under it.

In this context, freedom does not mean imposing meaning, but not being derivable from a single framework of meaning. Animals exist in a world whose significance escapes human totalization. Their autonomy consists precisely in their world-relation not conforming to prevailing human categories.

The appropriate human stance is therefore not control, not care, not administration, but loyalty and friendship toward a world whose meaning surpasses us.

Speciesism in a friendly guise
Liberal discourse distances itself from overt speciesism, but reproduces its structure:

Humans remain the norm-setting centre.
Animals remain normatively passive.
Freedom remains anthropologically prioritised.
Animals are no longer despised, but protected with reservations. No longer disregarded, but cared for with reservations. This is not a break with speciesism, but a structurally paternalistic update.

The reduction of animality – pro-animal and anti-animal
Both animal-hostile and animal-friendly worldviews share a basic assumption:

Animality is located outside the actual world.

Either as:

a resource,
a disruptive factor,
or a moral appendix and special case.
What is missing is the recognition of animality as a social reality, as an equally original component of worldly contexts of meaning. Thus, even the pro-animal discourse becomes a variant of the same reductive worldview that produces hostility towards animals. The worldview remains identical – only the tone and intention change.

The left-right dialectic as deprivation of liberty
This perspective also reveals why the classic left-right dialectic has reached its limits. Despite all their differences, both camps operate within the same basic framework:

The world as available
Meaning as defined by humans
Freedom as hierarchically assignable
The right openly legitimises the deprivation of the capacity for freedom – through order, naturalisation, property rights. The left problematises it morally – through protection, care, administration. Both sides share the assumption that the capacity for freedom can be deprived, limited or allocated. The dialectic thus revolves around the administration of deprivation, not its revocation.

As long as political camps are prioritised over a worldly perspective, they are allowed to impose philosophically restrictive worldviews: rigid orders of meaning in which freedom is either monopolised or regulated, but never fundamentally shared.

Why a break is necessary
A break is inevitable. Not a break from every single position wherever it is morally defensible, but from the assumption that political camps could be the final authority on questions of co-world ethics.

Our question is therefore

Not: How do we position ourselves on the left or right with regard to animals?

But rather: Why do humans claim the right to deny other their capacity of freedom in the first place?

Rights can only be meaningfully established where the original transgression is not taken for granted, but is radically problematised.

Beyond friendly administrative management
What is needed is not better protection and finer morals, but a different way of thinking:

Freedom not as human property,
The world not as a human project,
Rights not as an afterthought.
As long as the world view remains the same, violence will remain too – more polite, more legal, more philosophical, but not abolished. The alternative is not:

friendliness instead of violence. But rather: recognition instead of recourse. Only then will something begin that deserves this name.

Faunacide-Vectors: Freedom and Post-War Ethics

In contemporary discourse, figures of authority, emergency language, and migration politics dominate public attention. Meanwhile, faunacide and ecological destruction proceed largely unremarked, normalized as technical or logistical necessity. This analysis argues that such destruction is not incidental, but the structural endpoint of consumer belief systems: where inherited ethical frameworks are hollowed out, freedom becomes choice without responsibility, and moral reflection is suspended. Migration discourse absorbs ethical energy, obscuring the species-bound limitations of post-war ethics on both sides of the Atlantic. Faunacide thus reveals what these societies cannot confront — the ethical boundary at which civilization itself is measured.

Faunacide-Vectors: Consumer Belief, Freedom, and the Dissolution of cross Atlantic Post-War Ethics

Introduction: not decline, but a system outcome

What is commonly described as moral decline or cultural decay is better understood as a structural outcome of late consumer civilization. Ethics have not disappeared; they have been reorganized. Belief has not vanished; it has been simplified and “automatized”. Across both the United States and Germany – despite their radically different histories – ethical vocabularies are thinning,

freedom is reduced to gesture, and responsibility is increasingly externalized. This is not primarily the result of migration, religion, or individual ignorance, but of a deeper merger between inherited belief structures and market-generated logic, where cultural tension and collaboration add their dynamics but need to be seen in forefront of even further and global developments [anthropogenism; the belief that hegemonial human systems alone are the source and measure of meaning, value, and moral agency and relevance.].

Consumerism as a belief machine

Consumerism does not function merely by producing/selling/obtaining goods. It requires belief systems that are fast, emotionally legible, and low-cost. Skepticism, reflection, and ethical ambiguity slow markets down; simple belief accelerates them.

Thus consumerism produces beliefs that look moral but operate as habits:

freedom becomes choice between options,
identity becomes visible alignment,
goodness becomes certification or branding,
meaning becomes recognition.
These beliefs are not argued; they are absorbed. They do not ask for dedication, restraint, or responsibility, only participation.

Historically inherited belief structures in the Western Christianized world

Before consumerism, belief systems were heavy. They imposed limits and demanded ethical cost. Across religious, national, and philosophical traditions, four structural elements were central:

Belonging – identity rooted in shared fate (church, nation, class).
Moral authority – ethics grounded in something external to the individual (God, law, tradition).
Sacrifice – meaning produced through restraint, duty, or loss.
Teleology – history understood as directional, carrying responsibility across time.
These systems were often violent and exclusionary, but they produced ethical depth because belief was not frictionless.

The merger: structure retained, substance replaced
Consumerism did not destroy inherited belief forms; it ‘colonized’ them. The structures remain, but their substance is hollowed out.

Belonging becomes branding or camp affiliation.
Moral authority becomes metrics, algorithms, expertise, or visibility.
Sacrifice becomes performance and signaling.
Teleology becomes the illusion of progress through optimization and growth.
The result is belief without transcendence and ethics without cost. People feel morally certain while lacking ethical capacity. A vacuum is filled with externalized, delegated history making.

Freedom as consumer belief
This merger explains the collapse of freedom as an ethical concept.

Historically, freedom implied responsibility: the capacity to refuse, to limit oneself, and to bear consequences. In consumer logic, freedom is redefined as abundance of options, personalization, and exit without loss. Refusal appears antisocial, limits appear oppressive, and responsibility feels archaic.

Freedom survives as a slogan, not a practice.

Cross-Atlantic > The US and Germany: two failures, one convergence
The United States and Germany arrive at this condition from opposite directions.

The US developed a strong idea of freedom, but a thin ethical foundation. Freedom was primarily negative and expansive—freedom from restraint, freedom to act. When consumerism hollowed out meaning, freedom collapsed into spectacle, culture war, and belief without depth. Ethical language became binary and performative.

Germany, by contrast, never trusted freedom. Historically associated with chaos and danger, freedom was replaced after 1945 by order, legality, procedure, and later technocratic morality. Ethics became institutional rather than lived; responsibility was formalized while freedom was managed away. Germany exports compliance aesthetics rather than ethical autonomy.

One side retains identity without responsibility. The other retains responsibility language without freedom. Migration exposes this fracture, but does not initially cause it.

Migration, governance, and ethical suspension

Migration functions as an override switch because it brings ethical questions into the present tense. Rather than confronting universal responsibility, states reframe migrants as risks or management problems.

In the US, migration threatens symbolic identity and triggers overt exclusion. In Germany, migration is administratively absorbed through labor, NGOs, and procedural tolerance. Patriarchal and authoritarian social patterns are not admired, but instrumentalized as forms of low-cost order.

What appears as tolerance is often ethical abandonment. Violence becomes culturalized and responsibility diffused.

The rise of functional primitivism

The outcome is not barbarism, but functional primitivism: technologically advanced societies with reduced ethical articulation. Moral vocabularies shrink to slogans, outrage replaces judgment, and belonging overrides conscience.

This primitivism is systemic. It produces cheap consumers rather than thinking subjects, because thinking subjects introduce friction. Ethical complexity does not scale.

Why resistance collapses

Resistance movements fail when they adopt consumer belief logic: branding, optimization, moral simplification. At that point they no longer produce ethical subjects, only consumers of dissent. Critique becomes content; opposition becomes niche.

Faunacide: where the merger becomes undeniable

The structure described above reaches its clearest and most brutal expression in the human–animal relation. If there is one domain where the absence of freedom,

responsibility, and ethical depth can no longer be rhetorically concealed, it is the systematic destruction of nonhuman life.

Faunacide is not an anomaly within consumer civilization; it is its logical endpoint. Animals cannot be fully absorbed into consumer belief systems as moral subjects, because they do not participate in identity signaling, political camps, or symbolic belonging. They cannot be moralized into visibility. They can only be managed, optimized, and eliminated within this apparatus.

Here, the merger of inherited belief and market logic is exposed without remainder.

Animals as the absolute outside of consumer belief

Historically, animals were never outside belief systems. They were drawn into human world-making as sacrificial bodies, cosmological mediators, moral allegories, or co-inhabitants of an ordered cosmos. These positions were violent not only because animals were killed, but because their lives were subsumed under human narratives. Animals did not appear as wise, complete, knowing animals, but as carriers of meanings no space was left for their own ontological presence. Their suffering mattered as instrumental for symbolic, religious, or social coherence.

This narrative absorption was the first abstraction of animal life – and already a rehearsal of a basic philosophical human self-impoverishment. The capacity to overwrite living beings with imposed meaning, trained human consciousness to accept domination as sense-making.

Consumer civilization radicalizes this logic by assuming that it has overcome symbolic inclusion, to bolster the speciesist object status even more. Animals are narrated under the collective human terms that rule over them; they are processed by a system. They are expected to be seen as “units of production”, “datasets”, “environmental parameters”, or “interchangeable sustainability icons”. The shallow myth, ritual, or justification could easily become fauna that requires management, in forefront of humanities dominating identity.

Animals are excluded not only from moral considerations, but senses of belonging, own authority, own commitment, and teleology altogether is ascribed to the human sui generis. Animality is projected to exist only as functions within human systems.

Their experiences with this dominating ruled by humans carries the symbolic or ethical weight to humans that they rule over the nonhuman caste, homo sapiens confronts the world in this manner.

Their deaths do not interrupt the story of progress, because progress no longer tells a story – it merely continues.

In this sense, animals become the absolute outside of consumer belief: sacrificed for trifleness to mark the hight of contempt for animality; instrumentalized for meaning-via-negation, reduced to the experience of total interruption and trauma. The disappearance of animals from reasonable narratives with people marks not an ethical advance or mastery of sterility, but the final stage of a civilization that has learned to narrate life itself out of existence while grasping for full control.

Ethical collapse without ideological conflict

Migration functions as a global moral theater that pacifies speciesism across political camps. It generates permanent ideological conflict in which opposing human groups appear irreconcilable, while remaining structurally united in their domination of nonhuman life. The right externalizes violence by projecting brutality, disorder, and moral deficiency exclusively onto migrating individuals and groups; among migrants self-images marked by ostensive speciesism are signaled in the social scales deemed suitable; western/ized liberals and progressives respond within the same human-centered moral frame. All participants perform ethical conflict, while its deepest foundation – speciesist hegemonial destruction – remains untouched and unquestioned. Migration and cultural clashes absorb ethical energy and these conflicts allow societies to rehearse morality without confronting each groups and group mergers morality's limits.

Animals and Animal Habitats (Nature), by contrast, are not perceived as political subjects at all. They are framed as biological variables that appear and disappear,

not as beings and life whose destruction demands ethical confrontation. They are not granted any recognized constituency, any symbolic leverage, and no mirroring terms to destabilize current human identity politics. As a result, no ideological conflict is required. Faunacide proceeds without moral friction.

Where migration discourse erodes post-war ethics through the language of emergency, crisis, and exception, faunacide erodes them through normality. Industrial or single killings, habitat destruction, and extinction are processed as technical necessities, logistical challenges, or unintended side effects of progress – never as ethical events.

This asymmetry exposes the truth of post-war ethics. They were never universal. They were conditional, selectively applied, and fundamentally species-bound. What appears as moral polarization within humanity functions, in practice, as a shared silence regarding the systematic annihilation of nonhuman life.

Germany and the US: convergence at the animal boundary
Despite their differences, the United States and Germany converge completely in their destructive hegemony over animals and nature.

The US applies market freedom directly: animals are property, resources, inputs.
Germany applies managed ethics: welfare regulation, certification, procedural compassion.
Both systems produce the same outcome: large-scale, routinized annihilation.

Here, the contrast between freedom-without-ethics and ethics-without-freedom collapses. Animals and Nature receive neither.

Why animals expose the fiction of ethical progress
Animals reveal what consumer belief systems cannot tolerate: beings who demand ethical consideration without offering any symbolic return that fits the human belief systems. There is no consumer reward for civil courage towards animal and animal habitat concerns. No identity capital. No scalable narrative of sacrifice. Therefore, ethics is reduced to mitigation, not transformation. Sustainability discourse functions as the ultimate moral anesthesia. It preserves

the illusion of responsibility while protecting the underlying logic of destruction, murder and infliction of torture.

Faunacide as the measure of freedom

If freedom were understood as ethical capacity rather than option abundance, the human–animal relation would be its primary test. A society incapable of refusing systematic and individual animal destruction is not unfree because it is coerced, but because it lacks the ethical imagination to correct itself at all.

Faunacide thus becomes the negative proof of freedom: where animals are annihilated as agents of knowledge, an idea of freedom beyond utter insularity has simply been bypassed.

Conclusion: the boundary that cannot be outsourced

Animals mark the point where consumer civilization can no longer externalize responsibility. There is no cultural proxy, no intra-human unsolvable dilemma, no ideological schism onto which violence can be displaced.

Faunacide is not a side issue. It is the structural revelation that post-war ethics, consumer belief, and managed morality never combined a form of reason with a degree of involvement (…) where would have been necessary. The results are parallel developments of moral decay in all their consequences. A civilization that cannot articulate ethical responsibility toward nonhuman life has not lost its ethics, it has revealed that this ethical limit causes an inversion of anything that might be considered to be a “human” idea.

Farangis Yegane Arani: Leuchtfunken

LIGHTNING SPARKLES in
human souls
Lightning sparkles in beetle souls
bird souls fox souls
dog souls cat souls
tiger souls elephant souls
Lightning sparkles in all living beings
huge lightning sparkles firework

what god prescribes
radio silence to you?

We are: Subjectivist Animal Rights Punk

Photo of me taken by Derek Ridgers in the early 80ies.

Hi that's me, nice swine 1983. I have been doing animal rights punk since then and am still doing it, in German even, yet mainly in written form. In the 90s I made a music project called Menschenwurst End. Unfortunately, all our tapes are lost. Punk is activism. Nothing else. There's tons of shitty music without content around that ruins activism. Whatever you can do what is activism, just choose your own forms. It doesn't have to be music, it can come in any form and shape. It can be just by being who you are, in every aspect.

Referring to the agreements > on intersubjectivity between non-humans and humans that are now shared by several human individuals,

… in which both are recognized as thinking, self-reflecting subjects, with an unassailable and only self-defining, as-autarkically-editable right (that is, they are both living entities that may not be reductively objectified in their subjecthood in any way by external definition), on the part of humans in, for example, the manner explained in our publications …

we have initiated the autoethnographic and reflective music series TOTENGLOCKE. Good sounds for a meaningful motivation for self-creative action in the field of > subjective activism, antispe and multiperspectivity.



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And we are

Farangis G. Yegane, geb. Gertrud Waltraud Lück-Flender

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Dr. phil. Miriam Yegane Arani

The multicolored dog by Farangis



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

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